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ABSTRACT

The reinterpretation of past events has been a natural phenomenon of twentieth century historiography. Historical revisionism--the reshaping by contemporary scholars of traditional views of the past--has been an inevitable and necessary trait of the profession and has contributed to the growth of humankind's perception of previous generations. During the 1960s and 1970s, New Left or radical social criticism became dominant in the teaching of public issues. Radical revisionists, writing during the period of the Vietnam War, remade the past with powerful, thought-provoking themes and interpretations especially relative to Cold War origins. This overview for history teachers, especially those at the secondary level, reviews the legacy of New Left historians relative to their impact on trends in diplomatic history and the historical profession itself. (BZ)

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by

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Radical Revisionism and Cold War Interpretations: Decisions for Secondary History Teachers

The reinterpretation of past events has been a natural phenomenon of twentieth century American historiography. Historical revisionism -- the reshaping by contemporary scholars of traditional views of the past -- has been an inevitable and necessary trait of the profession and has contributed to the growth of humankind's perception of previous generations.[1] During the 1960s and 1970s a plethora of New Left or radical criticisms descended upon the reading public. Radical revisionists, writing during the period of the Vietnam War, remade the past with powerful, thought-provoking themes and interpretations especially relative to Cold War origins. Their verbal attacks, launched within the context of the war in southeast Asia, caused the liberal community to retract support for the principle of self-determination and upset and disturbed traditional thinking about the U.S. role and motives in world politics.

The purpose of this essay is to provide an overview for history teachers, especially those at the secondary level, of the legacy of New Left historians relative to their impact on trends in diplomatic history and the historical profession itself. New Left historians, in revising traditional views of the American diplomatic past, contributed much to critical assessments of U.S.

administrative explanation of the Cold War. The charges they directed against American foreign policy-makers and the methods several New Left historians used to enhance their charges led to much controversy within the historical profession.

High school teachers of history have found the New Left interpretation of the Cold War to be an effective way to challenge students regarding culpability for the Cold War. A recent article in the OAH Magazine of History, for instance, encourages teachers to expose students to radical revisionism because it "will challenge them and thus make them [the students] think about the issue more deeply" and by presenting two opposing interpretations students will examine strengths and weaknesses of each interpretation thus helping students to "build critical thinking skills." 2

This certainly may be the case for New Left, or radical, revisionist interpretations placed responsibility for the Cold War on the United States, not the Soviet Union. Students will no doubt be stimulated as they find that radical interpretations challenged the traditional, or orthodox, explanation of Cold War origins. And yet, the teacher of Cold War history may want to take the pedagogical procedure a step further by having students compare the evidence in the actual documents with the evidence as presented by some radical revisionists in their publicized works.

A decade has passed since Robert James Maddox, in his work The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War,[3] openly challenged radical historians' interpretations and practices used to enhance their interpretive mode. Maddox's book was an important contribution to Cold War literature, not because it had proposed new interpretations or had examined newly released documents, but because it indicted historians for neglecting their professional duties. Heretofore, only a few works had questioned the veracity and motivations of the New Left. In 1967 Irwin Unger had levelled several criticisms against radical historians in an article "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography."[4] Unger accused New Left historians of failing "to play the scholarly game by the most elementary rules of fair play." He described radical historians as "bad tempered" and as scholars who let the "tone and rhetoric of the picket line and the handbill . . . invade their professional work."[5] Robert W. Tucker's The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy and Joseph M. Siracusa's New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians[6] also made notable criticisms of New Left works. Both critics of New Left scholarship, though working independently, found radical writings to have lost a sense of proportion in stressing monocausal economics and forgetting that much of American diplomatic history is accidental.[7]

Maddox, with the publication of his book, shocked the academic community by charging New left historians, reviewers, editors, and reputable publishing companies with a failure to maintain the scholarly standards and attributes of the historical profession.[8] Radicals had persistently claimed that the documents verified their theses. Prompted by their assertions, Maddox selected seven notable New Left authors' books -- William Appleman Williams' The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, D.F. Fleming's The Cold War and Its Origins, Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy, David Horowitz's The Free World Colossus, Gabriel Kolko's The Politics of War, Diane Shaver Clemens' Yalta, and Lloyd C. Gardner's Architects of Illusion -- and "compared the evidence as presented by the revisionists with the sources from which the evidence was taken." His examination of these well-known works disclosed "pervasive misusages of the source materials"[9] plus the practice of tampering with the evidence through the use of ellipses so as to enhance the radical revisionist point of view.

Maddox charged that much of the New Left writing was "presented in the guise of scholarly analyses . . . rather than as the polemics they really are."[10] He accused New Left authors of "doing violence to the historical record"[11] through use of ellipsis and made a case that professionals, laymen, and students of the Cold War had "been poorly served by what can only be regarded as a striking malfunctioning of the critical mechanisms within the historical profession."[12]

The New Left critic claimed the purpose of his book was not intended to support the orthodox, or traditional, view. But his indictment of New Left scholarship most definitely had an impact on Cold War interpretations.

Maddox arranged New Left historians into two general classifications. The first group consisted of "soft" revisionists who stressed the importance of the individuals involved in Soviet-American relations. "Soft" revisionists, Maddox indicated, emphasized there was a sharp break in policy between Roosevelt and Truman, stressed personal failings, and concluded Truman and his advisers were to blame for the Cold War. The second group identified by Maddox was the "hard" revisionists. Rather than perceiving a deficiency in American statesmanship alone, "hard" revisionists suggested that the structural requirements of the American capitalist system, more than personal frailties, generated an expansionism in American foreign policy. Revisionists of this group suggested that a radical transformation in American institutions was needed to assuage Cold War tensions.13

From the end of World War II through the end of the Vietnam War, Cold War literature generated several discernable schools of interpretation. The orthodox, or traditional, view assigned blame for the Cold War to the Soviet Union and charged that Russian malevolence and expansion initiated the Cold War and forced Americans to

respond.[14] Revisionism has not accepted this traditional and American-oriented point of view. Realist historians, a revisionist school of interpretation that began writing in the 1950s and 1960s, did agree with the orthodox view that the Cold War was caused by the aggressive actions of the Soviets. While placing responsibility for the Cold War on the Russians, realists also cited American mistakes in judgment as contributing to the development of Soviet-American tensions. George F. Kennan, Louis J. Halle, John Spanier, and John Lukacs, for instance, showed that U.S. leaders failed to assess carefully the political and military effects of World War II. Kennan, an experienced diplomat who had served in Moscow and was a founder of the realist school of thought, critiqued the American approach to foreign policy during the 1930s and 1940s. In his commentary, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, he provided a terse, yet powerful, criticism of America's persistent legalism-moralism. In Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, Kennan maintained that American mistakes had emanated from exaggerated military concerns, liberal misunderstandings of Stalin's intentions, and a general lack of realism concerning Soviet post-war aims.15

Kennan's liberal interpretation of the Cold War developed in part as a response to right-wing charges that U.S. leaders had deliberately betrayed American interests in the mid-1940s through the early 1950s. Right-wing conservatives had pointed to the Russian broken promises of

Yalta (which was viewed as a liberal "sellout"), the collapse of Nationalist China in 1949 (which was viewed as "China lost"), and the 1949 Russian explosion of the A-bomb (which was viewed as a "shock") as evidence that liberals had violated American security and frittered away U.S. advantages in the international community. With the noteriety of the Alger Hiss case, right-wingers were able to charge that subversion had permeated the Roosevelt administration and that in trusting the Russians the cause of freedom had been sold out. Kennan's work served to refute the right-wing charge of the mid-twentieth century that American actions alone had decisively weakened the U.S. position in the postwar world. It offered the plausible explanation that the course of international affairs after the war was determined in large measure by the war itself. His works also provided the intellectual framework for a criticism of the legalistic-moralistic tradition in twentieth century American foreign policy.

New left revisionists, in stark contrast to both the orthodox and realist historians, placed total culpability for the Cold War squarely upon the United States. Radical revisionists argued that the United States provoked the Soviet Union by attempting to force American economic and political needs upon Eastern Europe. The New Left did not view the Cold War by either a balance of power thinking or by traditional, nationalistic views of the past. Rather, their writing reflected a strong Marxian critique of the

Cold War. New Left revisionists outrightly condemned American possession and use of power. The radicals attacked the capitalist system *per se* and provided a scenario that if capitalism were replaced, peace would be enjoyed throughout the world.

The initial publication of New Left accounts can be attributed to William Appleman Williams whose work, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*,[16] first appeared in 1959 and was reprinted in 1962 and 1972. This ideological oriented narrative provided the nucleus for subsequent New Left publications as other radical revisisonists either embellished the themes enunciated by Williams or produced interpretive spin-offs from his ground breaking work. A graduate from and former professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Williams' influence produced a "Wisconsin School" of American diplomatic history[17] whose membership would include Lloyd C. Gardner, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, and Walter LaFeber.

Williams, now teaching at Oregon State University, asserted in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* that American economic imperialism in Eastern Europe provided the impetus for the Cold War. Writing from a monocausal perspective, Williams claimed that American imperialism evolved from a need to overcome the problems of capitalism, overproduction, and depression. To solve the inadequacies of the American capitalist system, Williams determined, the United States

had devised an Open Door Policy (which to Williams and other radical revisionists had meant "free-trade imperialism") so as to enhance its needs for overseas economic markets. According to Williams, the national debate at the turn of the century between imperialists and anti-imperialists had been joined by a third group composed of "a coalition of businessmen, intellectuals, and politicians." This third force called for and convinced the nation to utilize its "preponderant economic strength" to "dominate all underdeveloped areas of the world."[18] On the heels of this debate, John Hays' Open Door pronouncements of 1899 and 1900 had been made and served to guide and direct American foreign policy in the twentieth century.

Whereas realists such as George F. Kennan would criticize the American Open Door Policy as a naive and idealistic gesture toward China,[19] Williams claimed that "the Open Door Policy was in fact a brilliant strategic stroke" which eventually evolved into an "extension of American economic and political power throughout the world." The New Left revisionist noted, however, that the American desire for an overseas empire "ultimately failed." But, the failure of American overseas expansion, he claimed, "was not because it was foolish or weak, but because it was so successful." Only after World War II did the Open Door strategem provoke an opposition able to withstand the pressures of American imperialism. And that occurred when the American President Harry S. Truman attempted to expand

"American economic and political influence on Eastern Europe and on the Asian mainland."[20] By the 1940s, American policymakers had come to believe that any nation that obstructed and thwarted the American Open Door goal became an enemy of the United States. Thus, when Soviet interests collided with U.S. economic imperial penetration into Eastern Europe, the Cold War began. The American leaders, Williams vowed, were so imbued with the Open Door mentality that "they seldom thought it necessary to explain or defend the approach."[21] Hence, to New Left critics Williams casually dismissed the fact that he found little documentary evidence to support his Open Door thesis.

Robert Maddox described Williams' Open Door thesis and approach as "proof by lack of evidence." The New Left critic wrote, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that where Williams had the facts he used them, and where he could find none he claimed their very absence corroborated his interpretation."[22] Maddox accused Williams of defying the standards of scholarship and accused the New Left author of creating "imaginary" speeches and dialogues by splicing together phrases uttered at different times and on diverse subjects."[23] The New Left critic, for instance, compared Williams' account of Stalin's initial remarks at the first plenary session of the Potsdam Conference to what has been documented in the second volume of the Potsdam Papers. The comparison led Maddox to exclaim, "Stalin made no speech." Rather, Williams had contrived Stalin's statements by

interspersing phrases from numerous segments of discussions that had occurred in the course of three days. Williams also substituted Russia for Yugoslavia and Greece as the intended recipients of Bulgarian reparations.24

In addition, Maddox charged Williams with using ellipses to distort the historical record. Williams had argued that while at Potsdam "American leaders were certain that the bomb, and Russia's great recovery needs, provided them with the leverage to re-establish the Open Door, and pro-Western governments, in eastern Europe."25 To show support for his thesis, Williams quoted a cable from Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp.26 As the citation was presented in Williams' book, Tragedy, a reader would certainly be left with the impression that Clayton was grieving over how the Potsdam participants were interpreting the reparations agreement. But Maddox pointed out that Williams' quote was very misleading. First, the New Left critic indicated Clayton's cable was not about how "subordinate officials back in Washington" had mistaken what had occurred at the conference table. Second, as if to lend credence to the citation, Williams had labelled Clayton's message as a "memorandum," not what it really was -- a cable. And third, by using ellipses, Williams neglected to indicate to the reader that Clayton's telegram also demonstrated

preparations were already underway for working within the structure of agreed upon "common policies."[27]

Other charges against Williams for convoluting the historical record were presented by Maddox. He cited Williams for misrepresenting discussions over the topic of German assets and investments as well as Germany's demilitarization. Such distortions, Maddox pronounced, were contrived so as to bolster Williams' view that "American officials acted as they did out of their determination to achieve an Open Door in Eastern Europe."[28] By connecting scattered comments of officials and arranging them in a sequential order, Maddox charged, Williams could make it appear (especially to one not familiar with the period) that a sustained discourse had taken place.

Maddox not only questioned the methods of William Appleman Williams. The New Left critic also accused six other radicals of falsifying evidence so as to buttress their interpretations of the Cold War. As an example, Maddox cited "soft" revisionist Gar Alperovitz in Atomic Diplomacy with distorting a quote from Harry Truman's Memoirs so as to show that the new President did not want to attend the Potsdam Conference without first being assured the atomic bomb would work. Alperovitz quoted a July 3 letter the President had written to his family as follows: "Truman made no attempt to hide his feelings: 'I am getting ready to go see Stalin and Churchill, and it is a

chore. . . . Wish I didn't have to go, but I do, and it can't be stopped now."[29] Maddox charged that in the context and in the manner in which Alperovitz presented Truman's remarks, the reader was led to believe that Truman had not relished attending the major conference without first knowing that the A-bomb would work. Maddox's scrutiny of Truman's letter as compared to Alperovitz's citation in Atomic Diplomacy to what Truman had written in his Memoirs demonstrated the radical revisionist had distorted Truman's simple words.

The President, to be sure, was complaining to his family members about the upcoming meeting -- but not about frustrations over postponement of the A-bomb test (which was completed on July 16, 1945). Alperovitz, Maddox felt, used ellipsis to remove Truman's real complaint and replaced it with his own radical view of how Truman intended to deal with Stalin. Truman's objections, Maddox declared, were really harmless comments about having to wear "tuxedo, tails . . . [Truman's ellipsis] preacher coat, high hat, low hat and hard hat as well as sundry other things . . ."[30] while attending the gatherings of heads of state. The New Left author's use of ellipsis prompted Maddox to comment:

> What Alperovitz presented as the words of President Truman, global strategist, turns out to be Ol' Cap'n Harry, complaining to "Momma and Mary" about the formalities he would have to endure.[31]

For sundry reasons Maddox charged the seven radical historians in his book with making egregious errors in order to buttress their charge that the United States had caused the Cold War. Several historians came to the defense of the authors Maddox had chastized claiming Maddox was condemning "interpretations -- not falsification of the evidence."[32] Maddox and other New Left critics felt that "No historian should be able to play fast and loose with records and escape with his reputation intact."[33] At best New Left critics determined radicals had a "circumstantial case" against the American government.[34]

Not all revisionists have been subjected to such scrutiny. Nor have all radical revisionist works been charged with lacking credibility. Walter La Feber's <u>America, Russia, and the Cold War</u> and Thomas G. Paterson's monograph <u>Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War</u>[35] reflect the revisionist economic view but provide a subdued New Left rhetoric.

Most recently are historians who claim to write from a "postrevisionist" perspective. Assimilating views from all three schools of interpretation is John Lewis Gaddis who claims he has moved away from the Vietnam syndrome. While recognizing the radical emphasis of the Open Door policy and economic influences upon American foreign policy, Gaddis

criticized New Left historians for having too narrow an approach. In his works The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 and Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History,[36] Gaddis insisted that to understand the evolution of U.S. foreign policy of the 1940s, historians must equally appreciate American domestic politics and public perceptions, whether correct or incorrect, of Soviet intentions. Thus, Gaddis responded to New Left charges that the U.S. intended to compel the world to accept American capitalism by retorting that these actions were not intended as aggressive, forceful, or malicious nor were they imperialistic desires. Rather, American actions were taken in hopes of raising living standards throughout the world and of preserving peace. In two of his works on American foreign policy and Russian-American relations, Gaddis concluded that the major error committed by U.S. policymakers was their attempt to solve the economic difficulties of the world before the political differences between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had been resolved. Thus, politics, not economics, eventually became more important in the diplomatic relationships of these two superpower nations.

Although Gaddis incorporated numerous revisionist themes within his works, he placed culpability for the Cold War squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union. He viewed the U.S. shift from a policy of cooperation to a stance of toughness as a specific response to Soviet

actions.[37] The American hope that the Soviet Union would cooperate after the war was based on the belief, encouraged by Joseph Stalin, that the Kremlin " had given up its former goal of exporting communism."[38] Soviet movement into Eastern Europe in 1944 and 1945, coupled with the eventual renewal of a world communist movement, caused the West to believe it had been misled. Gaddis emphasized that at critical moments the Truman administration was under pressure to take a harsher attitude toward their Soviet adversaries. The "postrevisionist" cited public opinion polls as examples reflecting American sentiment and concluded that Stalin had more "chances to surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the West."[39]

Cold War historiography has suggested that an intense struggle occurred not only between American and Russian leaders but among historians themselves.[40] Extreme positions in interpretation have resulted in each school of interpretation claiming a more accurate version of the breakdown in Soviet-American relations. New Left revisionism, in providing an assessment of Cold War culpability through a Marxian critique, has left its mark on the profession and pentrates works made available to the reading public.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in the 1960s temporarily enhanced the New Left revisionist Open Door

thesis. American involvement in both the Vietnam War and the Cold War, radicals would insist, was not the result of defending self-determination but an ineluctable consequence of the failing American social, economic, and political systems. For a time the influence of Vietnam did cause the liberal community to retract support for the principle of self-determination. But the Open Door thesis, a surrogate for the ideal of self-determination, has by no means been conclusive relative to the Vietnam experience; nor has the radical reassessment of post-World War II Soviet-American relations been confirmed. New Left historians' lack Soviet source materials to buttress their interpretations and the practices of several radical historians, though not all, to employ seriatim quotations and use of ellipses to create a case against American officials make their charges highly interesting but certainly questionable.

The dilemma for history teachers is obvious. Students who are neophytes in the study of history tend to accept historical truth as some fixed or immutable past and the written reconstruction of the past by any one historian as the final and definitive version of what took place. Historiography suggests there is no final version of events in the past. Thus, history teachers should expose students to diverse interpretations of historians, for such an instructional strategy most assuredly will benefit students. Yet, because of charges by members within the historical profession that some historians, especially those with a

radical revisionist bent, have tampered with the evidence, should all interpretations be indiscriminately employed merely to provoke thought? If so, it may be wise to have students examine as well the evidence upon which historians base their interpretations.

Footnotes

[1]An excellent commentary on American historiography since World War II can be found in Carl N. Degler's presidential address to the Organization of American Historians. See Carl N. Degler, "Remaking American History," The Journal of American History 67 (June 1980): 7-25.

[2]Kevin O'Reilly, "Teaching the Revisionist Interpretation of the Cold War," Magazine of History 2 (Summer 1986): 21-23.

[3]Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[4]Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," American Historical Review 72 (July 1967): 1237-1263.

[5]Ibid., p. 1262.

[6] Robert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), and Joseph M. Siracusa, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973).

[7]Robert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, pp. 70-156, and Joseph M. Siracusa, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians, pp. 104-119.

[8]Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.159-160.

[9]Ibid., p. 10.

[10]Ibid., p. 159.

[11]Ibid., p. 164.

[12]Ibid., p. 160.

[13]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[14]For example, Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), and Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

[15]George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (New York: New American Library, 1951), pp. 68-76, and George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 368.

[16]William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959; reprint ed., New York: Delta Publishing Co., Inc., 1962; reprint ed., New York: Delta Publishing Co., Inc., 1972).

[17]Joseph M. Siracusa, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians, p. 23.

[18]William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, pp. 37, 43.

[19]George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, pp. 23-37.

[20]William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, pp. 38, 44-46.

[21]Ibid., p. 206.

[22]Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 19.

[23]Ibid., p. 20.

[24]Ibid., p. 21.

[25]William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p, 253.

[26]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conderence) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 2: 938-940.

[27]Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 24.

[28]Ibid., p. 28.

[29]Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 145.

[30]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), p. 331.

[31]Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 72.

[32]For instance, see Warren F. Kimball, "The Cold War Warmed Over," American Historical Review 79 (October-December 1974): 1130. Also see Richard H. Miller, "A Verbal Mugging," New York Review of Books, June 14, 1973, p. 34; Ronald Radosh, "Hot War With 'New Left,'" The Nation, July 16, 1973, p. 55; Thomas A. Krueger, "New Left Revisionists and Their Critics," Reviews in American History 1 (December 1973): 465; and Robert D. Schulzinger, "Moderation in Pursuit of Truth Is No Virtue: Extremism in Defense of Moderation is a Vice," American Quarterly 27 (March-August 1975): 232.

[33]For example, see Thomas H. Etzold, "Seven Against Clio," Modern Age (Winter 1974): 98. Also see Daniel M. Smith, review of The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War in Journal of Southern History 39 (November 1973): 624; Charles Burton Marshall, "Historians and the Cold War," The Virginia Quarterly Review 49 (Autumn 1973): 626-627; and Bennett Kovrig, review of The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War in Political Science Quarterly 89 (March 1974): 204.

[34]Interestingly, a most recent reprint has been that of Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965; reprint ed., New York: Penguin Books, 1985). Alperovitz refers to Maddox's accusations against his book in a footnote by referring the reader to his "Response, Journal of American History (March 1973): 1062-1067.

[35]Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1976), and Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[36]John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), and John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive Essay (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1978).

[37]John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, p. 200.

[38]Ibid., p. 355.

[39]Ibid., p. 361.

[40]Two excellent bibliographic essays on Cold War writings are Norman A. Graebner, ed., The Cold War: A Conflict of Ideology and Power (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), and Edward S. Shapiro, "Responsibility for the Cold War: A Bibliographic Review," The Inter-

collegiate Review 12 (Winter, 1976-1977): 113-120.